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Abstract 
 
 
Implementation of the European internal market and East-West integration has been 
accompanied by a dramatic change in the spatial distribution of economic activity, with higher 
growth west and east of a longitude degree through Germany and Italy. In the east, income 
growth has been accompanied by increasing regional disparities within countries. We 
examine theoretically and empirically whether European integration as such can explain 
these developments. Using a numerical simulation model with 9 countries and 90 regions, 
theoretical predictions are derived about how various patterns of integration may affect the 
income distribution. Comparing with reality, we find that a reduction in distance-related trade 
costs combined with east-west integration is best able to explain the actual changes in 
Europe’s economic geography. This suggests that the implementation of the European 
internal market or the Euro has “made Europe smaller”. In Central Europe, capital regions 
grow faster and there are few east-west growth differences inside countries. There is no 
convincing support for the hypothesis that European integration had adverse effects on non-
members.  
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1. Introduction* 
 
 
Since the fall of the iron curtain, Europe has been subject to a number of profound 
reforms and changes. During the early 1990s, the European internal market was established, 
and the process of East-West European integration started – eventually leading up to the 
recent enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007. From integration within a club of rich 
countries in Western Europe during the 1960’s and 1970’s, integration has expanded to the 
south and east. The implementation of reforms takes time and Europe is still in a period of 
change. Nevertheless, almost two decades have passed since the process started and we 
now have data to examine whether the reforms have caused dramatic changes in the 
economic landscape of Europe.  
 In the former “rich man’s club”, there was a belt of agglomeration, popularised in the 
concept of the so-called “blue banana” stretching from London to Milano (Brunet 2002). This 
pattern of agglomeration mainly survived the enlargement of the EEC from 6 to 15 members. 
During the period before 1990, enlargement to the south contributed to economic 
convergence across countries, and little change – or modest increase – in regional 
disparities within countries (see e.g. Combes and Overman 2005, Cappelen et al. 1999, and 
also Ben David 1996).  For the post-1990 period, recent evidence similarly suggests that 
there has been convergence across countries in the wider Europe, but regional inequality 
has increased considerably in new member states (see e.g. World Bank 2000, Römisch 
2003, Landesmann and Römisch 2006, Melchior 2008a). 
A better understanding of regional dynamics is urgent not only for those affected but 
also for policy: regional support constitutes a main component of the common policies of the 
European Union. Some research suggests that EU regional policies are effective in some 
cases but not always (see e.g. Ederveen et al. 2006). According to Baldrin and Canova 
(2001), these policies mainly have a redistributive role with little impact on growth. For 
understanding when such policies are effective and when they are not, it is crucial to 
understand the dynamics of regional change as well as the impact of other policies. In 
particular, we should understand the impact of integration itself: Does European integration 
as such contribute to regional convergence or more disparities? In the light of growing 
                                                 
* I thank Maryla Maliszewska, Per Botolf Maurseth and Fredrik Wilhelmsson for useful comments to an earlier 
draft. Financial support from the EU 6th Framework Programme and the Norwegian Research Council is gratefully 
acknowledged. Data were collected as part of the ENEPO (European Eastern Neighbourhood – Economic 
Potential and Future Development) project and I thank Fredrik Wilhelmsson and Linda Skjold Oksnes for their 
participation in this. I thank colleagues at CEFIR/ Moscow and Kyiv School of Economics for their assistance in 
providing data for Russia and Ukraine, respectively, and Cesar de Diego Diez at Eurostat/GISCO for supplying 
geodata for NUTS 3 regions. 
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regional disparities in Central and Eastern Europe, the issue is even more “burning”. In the 
context of the EU Neighbourhood Policy (see e.g. Dodini and Fantini 2006), an urgent issue 
is whether there is an “agglomeration shadow” whereby regions outside the enlarged EU are 
worse off.  
As argued by Puga (1999, 2002), new theories of industrial location may add to this 
understanding, and this paper represents an effort to add to our knowledge about integration 
and the economic geography of Europe.  The purpose of this paper is to examine how 
European integration has affected the income distribution across countries and regions. We 
start by showing that there has recently been a sharp change along Europe’s East-West 
axis; with higher growth to the east and west of a longitude degree passing through Italy and 
Germany. The further away from this longitude, the higher is regional growth. During the 
period covered, there is a gradual switch from western growth (Ireland, Portugal, Spain) to 
eastern growth (in the new EU member states). As an attempt to understand this 
development, we use a large-scale numerical simulation model as a basis for econometric 
analysis. We show that in Western-Europe, the east-west gradient of growth differences 
applies within countries as well as between them. In Central Europe, however, capital 
regions dominate and wipe out the east-west growth differences within countries, so here the 
east-west growth pattern (with higher growth in the east) is driven by differences across 
countries. Comparing to results from the simulation model, we tentatively conclude that in 
Western Europe, this development is driven by reductions in the “cost of distance” due to the 
EU internal market. In Central Europe, the impact of wider European integration dominates; 
jointly with transition that may explain the dominating role of capital regions. For Eastern 
Europe, we do not find evidence confirming the presence of an “agglomeration shadow”.  
In the new economic geography literature, numerical simulation models with many 
regions have been used for theoretical purposes.  Fujita et al. (1999, Chapter 18) analyse 
patterns of agglomeration across regions spread out along the circumference of a circle and 
show that lower trade costs can lead to fewer and larger agglomerations. Venables (1999) 
examine the location of different industries in a setting with many regions on a circular plain. 
Approaching the real-world economic geography in Europe, Stelder (2005) uses a large-
scale simulation model in order to study the location of cities in Europe. In the current paper, 
we use a stylised model with a two-dimensional space (a rectangular plain) in the theoretical 
part in order to capture some features of the European landscape. Based on this we derive 
predictions and hypotheses for empirical analysis, and then revert to the model in the light of 
the empirical findings. However we do not attempt to construct a numerically realistic or 
calibrated model fitted to actual data. Hence the simulation model is used for theoretical 
purposes and not a computable equilibrium (CGE) approach, as in e.g. Bröcker and 
Schneider (2002). In the paper, we attempt to develop “geographical economics”, by using 
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quasi-realistic numerical modelling in order to understand true spatial effects. The purpose of 
the theory is not to derive universal predictions, e.g. that “globalisation promotes regional 
inequality” or the like. We maintain that such universal predictions do not exist; the effects 
depend on the specific reforms undertaken as well as the initial income distribution.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, a descriptive account of economic 
growth patterns in Europe is presented, using data at the regional level for 1995-2005 
covering 29 countries and 1410 regions. In Section 3, we explain the numerical simulation 
model with nine countries and 90 regions that is used to derive predictions about spatial 
change. We then compare different scenarios with actual empirical trends and draw tentative 
conclusions about the forces driving the substantial changes in Europe’s economic 
geography. In section 4, we analyse empirically whether the observed east-west pattern of 
growth differentials is driven mainly by differences across countries, or whether it is also 
reflected across regions within countries (as suggested by the numerical simulation model). 
In this way, we arrive at tentative but nevertheless relatively clear conclusions about the 
driving forces behind the changes in Europe’s economic geography. In section 5, we revert 
to the theoretical model and show a revised scenario which is close to the observed pattern. 
In section 6, we sum up some of the results and present some concluding comments as well 
as ideas for future research. 
 
 
2. The economic geography of Europe: Major changes 1995-
2005 
 
 
In Melchior (2008a), trends in within-country regional inequality are analysed using a 
similar but extended data set. Based on this study, Figure 1 summarises some results for the 
EU-27 plus Croatia, Norway and Ukraine.1 Darker colour indicates a higher increase in 
domestic regional inequality. For the brightest areas (except white=missing), there was little 
change or even some reduction in domestic regional inequality. The diagram is based on 
population-weighted Gini coefficients for domestic regional inequality during 1995-2005. 
Using annual estimates for the Ginis, a predicted trend over time has been derived for each 
country by means of regression analysis.2 The results from this are shown in the diagram. 
                                                 
1 Denmark and Switzerland are missing and therefore white areas.  
2 By using this method, we also correct for variations in the number of years covered for each country, cf. 
Appendix Table A1. In Figure 1, Russia is not included due to limitations in the map data available (using the SAS 
system version 9.1.3).  
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Figure 1: Changes in domestic regional inequality in Europe, 1995-2005. 
 
In the whole eastern part and with no exceptions among the countries covered, there 
was a substantial increase in regional disparities. In the central areas from Italy to Norway, 
there was little change or even some reduction in regional inequality. Moving westward, we 
find modest changes but some increase in e.g. the UK and Ireland. These changes in 
regional inequality are correlated with income levels as well as growth: Relatively poor 
countries had faster growth but also increasing regional inequality. At the European level, 
income convergence across countries is quantitatively more important than income 
divergence within some countries. On the whole, therefore, there was income convergence 
in Europe (ibid.).  
 This is the point of departure for the analysis to be undertaken here. Given our 
interest in the impact of east-west integration, we are particularly interested in the spatial 
east-west dimension of European economic development. In addition, we focus on the 
interaction between international changes (between countries) and regional changes within 
countries: How does international integration affect domestic regions? 
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 In the economic growth literature, the North-South dimension has sometimes been 
explored, e.g. with the underlying motivation that climatic differences may affect growth. On 
such grounds, latitudes have been used as explanatory variables in the analysis (see e.g. 
Rodrigues-Pose and Telios 2008 for a recent contribution using latitudes, focusing on 
Western European regions). In our analysis, we will also include latitudes, since we are 
interested in tracing spatial patterns of change generally. However our core focus will be on 
the east-west aspect and therefore longitudes.  
 In the empirical analysis, we use regional data on real GDP and population for 28 
countries: 23 countries among EU-27 (Denmark, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are 
dropped due to missing data or limited regional subdivisions), plus Norway, Croatia, Russia, 
Turkey and Ukraine. Information about data and sources is provided in Appendix A. In parts 
of the analysis, we also report results where Germany is split into East and West. In order to 
obtain a more detailed spatial subdivision, and in order to have a sufficiently large number of 
regions in the smaller countries, we mostly use regional data at the more detailed NUTS 3 
classification level.  The data set therefore contains 1410 regions.  
 For all countries except Russia and Ukraine, we use income data in purchasing 
power parities (PPPs) and constant prices, so figures are comparable across countries and 
over time. Observe, however, that PPPs are national and not regional, so income 
comparisons across regions within a country may be biased to the extent that price levels or 
inflation rates differ across regions within this country. This also applies to the non-PPP 
countries Russia and Ukraine. For Russia, inflation rates may differ substantially across 
regions and the lack of satisfactory regional price data is a limitation (Gluschenko 2006, see 
also Melchior 2008a). Given the large number of countries covered by the analysis here we 
do not attempt to correct for within-country differences in price levels or inflation rates, but 
leave this as a task for future research.  
 Data on income and population are supplemented with data on latitude and longitude 
for each region. For NUTS 3 regions, we use coordinates for centre points used by Eurostat 
for labelling maps.3  For Poland, Russia and Ukraine we use coordinates for regional 
administrative centres from the Geocities database.  
Figure 2 shows income averages in 1995 and 2005 for all regions at each longitude 
degree, for 1204 regions in our sample (excluding Croatia, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine due 
to limited time series or lack of comparable income data).4  
 
                                                 
3 For explanation of the NUTS classification of regions, see Eurostat (2007). 
4 For some countries with a shorter time span covered (Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Romania) the first year covered 
differs from 1995. 
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Figure 2: Average income levels in EU-27/EEA regions by longitude, 1995 
and 2005
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In order to facilitate the interpretation of the graph, Figure A1 in the Appendix shows 
the range of longitudes spanned by the regions of each country in the graph.5 To the far west 
we find Portugal, Ireland, Spain and then the UK. At the centre we find e.g. Western 
Germany (longitude range 9.4-13.5), Italy (12.2-18.1) and others. Estonia, Finland, Bulgaria 
and Romania are located furthest east.  
 In both periods, there is a distinct W-shaped distribution, with peak income levels in 
the central areas with longitudes around 8-10. Comparing levels in the two periods, we 
observe that absolute increases are slightly larger in the western half of the diagram. The 
relative increase is however larger towards the east. In order to see this more clearly, Figure 
3 shows average annual growth rates by longitude, using the same data set.  
 
                                                 
5 We use centre point for regions so regional border areas are not covered. 
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Figure 3: Per capita income growth rate averages
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Now the W is inverted, approaching an M. The pattern of growth differentials is quite 
characteristic, especially in the mid-range where a sharp V is present. Hence the pattern of 
growth differences across European regions has an easily discernible and distinct spatial 
dimension during the period. Observe that this applies to the east-west dimension – a similar 
pattern is not present in the North-South direction. 
 Comparing Figures 2 and 3, it is evident that there is an inverse relationship between 
initial income and growth. Melchior (2008a, Appendix E) presents simple growth regressions 
that confirm the trend towards convergence. The analysis also shows that growth in eastern 
EU-27 countries was higher and European convergence more pronounced after 2000. In 
order to check how this affects the pattern above, we split the period into two halves; shown 
in Figures 4a (1995-2000) and 4b (2000-2005).  
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In the most recent period, growth in Western Europe was slower and growth in 
Central/Eastern Europe higher. For 2000-2005, the pattern approaches a U-shape with 
higher growth in the east. Figure 3 represents an average of the two periods; but its shape is 
considerably influenced by period two since growth differences were greater then. 
Figures 3 and 4 include countries with widely varying latitudes, from the 
Mediterranean to the Nordics. Hence there is a risk that the patterns not only represent east-
west dimensions, but also north-south patterns of development. For example, Finland and 
Greece are included in the group of countries to the far east and these are also extremes 
along the north-south scale in Europe. In the west, Spain and Portugal are mixed with the UK 
and Ireland, and in the middle, Mezzogiorno in Italy and the regions of Norway or Sweden all 
contribute to the average. As an attempt to “purify” the central east-west dimension, we drop 
regions with a latitude below 45 or above 55 degrees. In the south; we drop Portugal, Spain, 
Greece, Bulgaria and parts of Italy and Romania. In the north, we drop the Nordic and partly 
the Baltic area, and a small part of the UK. In this way, we make the east poorer and the 
west richer than in the former sample. The cut-off points are evidently arbitrary but the 
exercise serves to illustrate that the east-west gradient is even clearer in this “central belt”. In 
Figures 5, we replicate Figure 3, showing growth rates by longitude for this more restricted 
sample over the whole period.    
 
Figure 4: East-West patterns of growth, by time period 
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Figure 5: Average annual regional growth in income per capita, 
1995-2005, for a "central belt"
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Within this central belt from west to east in Europe, the W-shape observed in Figure 3 
disappears and we approach a clean V or U or W pattern, with a minimum at a longitude of 
7-9. In our sample, this is mainly an average for the regions in Western Germany and Italy. 
This visualisation of European growth demonstrates that it has a clear spatial dimension.  
One possible continuation of the story would be to undertake growth regression 
analysis; analysing whether growth depends on initial income. With our focus on spatial 
effects, this is however a secondary issue. We will also see later that when we control for 
spatial effects, initial income actually plays a limited role.  
In order to illustrate some methodological issues for the statistical analysis, we 
regress growth rates on longitudes with a dummy that allows for a break point at some 
intermediate longitude: i.e. an equation of the form 
 
 gi = α + αeast * Deast+ β * LONi + βeast * Deast-i * LONi + εi            (1) 
 
where g is the growth rate, Deast is a dummy for observations with longitudes above some 
critical value, LON is the longitude, ε is the residual, and i refers to an individual observation 
(region). Hence we allow the constant term as well as the slope to be different for higher 
longitudes, as measured by the “deviation parameters” αeast (for the intercept) and βeast (for 
the slope). We experiment with different break points and chose LON=8 which gives the 
highest adjusted R2. This gives the following results: 
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Table 1: East-west gradients of regional growth in Europe 
 
Sample Period α αeast β βeast Adj. R2 N 
1995-2005 4.37 -2.87 -0.13 0.30 0.27 1204 
1995-2000 5.49 -2.07 -0.15 0.22 0.09 1162 
Regions in 23 
EU countries 
plus Norway 2000-2005 3.28 -3.84 -0.11 0.40 0.36 1204 
1995-2005 4.47 -3.82 -0.18 0.43 0.40 846 
1995-2000 5.78 -4.25 -0.23 0.46 0.22 817 “Central belt”  
2000-2005 3.20 -4.58 -0.12 0.50 0.46 846 
Note: Results from OLS regressions. P values were below 0.0001 in all cases. 
 
The results confirm the patterns shown above: Growth is significantly related to 
longitude. The fit is better for the second period compared to the first, and for the central belt 
compared to the whole sample. For the central belt, adjusted R2 in the second half of the 
period was 0.46. All parameter estimates are highly significant, with P values below 0.0001. 
 These estimates could however suffer from an omitted variable bias as well as other 
aspects that may render the assumption of normally and independently distributed residuals 
invalid. In particular, the regressions neglect any country-specific spatial effects. There could 
be a distinct core-periphery pattern inside countries, or there could be east-west gradients at 
the country level that differ from those that apply to Europe as a whole. If such features are 
present, the residuals could be spatially correlated at the country level. We will revert to such 
issues in Section 4, after discussing potential explanations of the V-shaped growth pattern 
observed in the analysis above.  
 
 
3. U-shapes revisited: A numerical simulation analysis 
 
 
In the new economic geography literature, the “U-curve” has become a standard term 
(see e.g. Forslid et al. 2002). Demonstrated in NEG models such as Krugman (1991), a 
common theme is that agglomeration is stronger at intermediate levels of trade costs. The 
presence of trade costs creates a disadvantage for the peripheral regions, but with very high 
trade costs trade is limited so the better located regions may not exploit their locational 
advantage. With intermediate barriers this becomes possible. But when barriers become low 
enough, the disadvantage of the periphery disappears and a more dispersed pattern of 
production, with less inequality, is again possible. Hence when trade costs are gradually 
lowered from initially high levels, it is expected that agglomeration first increase and 
thereafter decrease when trade costs become low enough.  
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 While this theoretical result is plausible, it is formulated in models with few regions 
and limited spatial structure. In the European context, it dos not tell us much about where the 
core actually is located geographically, or how this might change. Will the so-called “blue 
banana” from London to Milan (Brunet 2002) remain the core of the European economy, or 
will it be weakened and replaced by something else? Europe is affected by a number of 
different processes that affect trade costs: Initial EU integration, wider European integration, 
EU enlargement, a number of free trade agreements, multilateral liberalisation through the 
WTO (the World Trade Organization), and reduction in transport costs and other trade costs. 
It would be implausible to assume that all these have a similar impact. For assessing the 
spatial impact of such changes, we therefore need a model with sufficient dimensionality and 
an explicit modelling of spatial characteristics. In their survey of the NEG, Fujita and Mori 
(2005) consider the development of higher-dimensional spatial models as one of the top 
priorities for future research in the field. In order to examine what may explain the U-patterns 
observed in Figures 2-5, we therefore develop a numerical simulation model. Another 
contribution in this direction is Stelder (2005), who study the location of European cities using 
a NEG model with labour migration. Various computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
(see e.g. Forslid et al. 2002) may also be relevant, although they do not explicitly focus on 
the spatial dimension that is the focus here.  
 In standard NEG models as well as new trade theory models in the footsteps of 
Krugman (1980), results often depend on strong inter-sectoral specialisation or trade effects: 
Large countries or core regions become exporters of scale-based goods, as illustrated by the 
so-called home market effect. In their survey of agglomeration and trade, Head and Mayer 
(2004, p. 2663) however conclude that in empirical work, the relationship between 
agglomeration and income levels is more strongly supported than the relationship between 
agglomeration and trade specialisation. For Europe, one finds a variety of patterns at the 
industry level (see e.g. Forslid et al. 2002, and the survey in Combes and Overman 2004). 
Comparing Western Europe and the USA, one finds less industrial concentration in Europe, 
and one might therefore expect a more even income distribution across regions. The 
opposite is however the case (Puga 2002, Melchior 2008a), and this casts some doubt about 
the predictions of NEG models with strong net trade effects.6  
 This evidence is one reason why in this paper, we try another approach to 
agglomeration and income differences. Krugman (1980) showed that differences in market 
access may show up in two ways; either as inter-sectoral net trade effects or, alternatively, 
as wage effects. As an alternative to the models with net trade effects, we therefore try out a 
                                                 
6 The net trade effects normally also depend on strong asymmetries across sectors; for example that there are 
trade costs for one sector and not the other, and when these asymmetries are dropped, the net trade effects may 
disappear (see Davis 1998). 
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model where the whole economy is collapsed into a single sector, producing differentiated 
goods with economies of scale. While the volume of trade varies across scenarios, there are 
no net trade effects, and differences in market access show up only in differences in nominal 
and real wages. We will therefore call it the wage gap model. In the following, we explain the 
structure of the model. 
 
3.1. The wage gap model 
 
There are N regions. Each region, indexed i or j, has a single factor of production; 
labour, with endowment Li and wage wi. The total income of the economy is therefore Yi=wiLi. 
Following a standard Dixit-Stiglitz approach, labour can be used in the production of 
individual varieties of manufactured goods under increasing returns to scale. For an 
individual variety xi produced in region i, there is, measured in labour units, a fixed production 
cost f, constant marginal costs c and trade costs tij for sales in market j. For a good produced 
in region i and sold in market j, the cost in value terms is equal to wi (f+ctijxij). Trade costs are 
expressed as a mark-up on marginal costs so tij≥1, e.g. a trade cost of 10% implies tij=1.1. 7  
 We assume standard CES (constant elasticity of substitution) demand functions, so 
demand for a variety from region i in market j is equal to xij = pij-εPjε-1Yj where pij is the price of 
a variety from region i in market j, ε is the elasticity of substitution between varieties (with the 
standard assumption ε>1), Pj is the CES price index in region j. With monopolistic 
competition, firms maximise profits πi=-fwi+ Σj (pij-wictij)xij, and we obtain the standard pricing 
condition pij=[ε/(ε-1)] wi ctij. Furthermore, free entry and exit imply that total profits for a firm 
have to equal sunk costs f, and as a consequence the total value of sales for a firm in region 
i will be εfwi.  
 Now write vij = xijpij for the value of sales of an individual firm from region i in some 
market j. Dividing vij by vjj, we can express the sales vij in some market j as a function of the 
home market sales vjj of firms in that market: Using the demand functions and the pricing 
condition, we obtain vij = vjj * (wi/wj)1-ε (tij/tjj)1-ε. Using this, the total sales of a firm in region i, ∑j 
vij=εfwi, can be written as  
 
∑j vjj (wi/wj)1-ε (tij/tjj)1-ε= εfwi 
 
or, moving the common term wi to the right hand side,  
 
∑j vjj wjε-1 (tij/tjj)1-ε= εf*wiε. 
                                                 
7 We consider it simpler in terms of notation to express trade costs as a mark-up on marginal costs rather than the 
usual iceberg formulation where goods melt away in transport. The results are similar. 
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For the N regions, we have N equations with 2N unknowns (vii, wi). In order to express this in 
matrix form, we define 
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T expresses the relative trade costs in all markets, relative to domestic supply. Using 
this, the equation system above can be written as 
 
 TN×N × Diag (wiε-1) N×N × [vii] N×1 = εf × [wiε]N×1              (1) 
 
where Diag (wiε-1) N×N is the diagonal matrix with wiε-1 as diagonal elements, [vii] N×1 is a vector 
with vii (i.e. the home market sales of firms in each region) as elements, and [wiε]N×1 is a 
vector with wiε as diagonal elements. 
 Since manufacturing is the only sector in the economy, the sales of all firms in market 
j must add up to Yj; i.e. ∑i nivij=Yj. ni is the number of manufacturing firms in region i, and 
since there is no firm heterogeneity, and no sunk exports costs, all firms will sell a (large or 
small) positive amount in any market. Expressing all vij’s in terms of home market sales as 
above, we can put wi and vii on the right hand side and obtain the system of N equations  
 
 TN×N’× Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [ni] N×1 = Diag (vii-1) N×N × Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [Yi]N×1            (2) 
 
Given that firm size is determined (see above) and assuming full employment, the number of 
manufacturing firms must be ni= wiLi/(εfwi)= Li/(εf). Thereby eliminating the unknowns ni, we 
obtain a system with 2N unknowns that may be solved. Equation (2) then simplifies to:  
 
 TN×N’× Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [Li] N×1 = εf × Diag (vii-1) N×N × Diag (wi2-ε) N×N × [Li]N×1         (2a) 
 
This is however a non-linear system where no explicit analytical solution can be 
found.8 We therefore use numerical simulation in order to determine the outcome. As noted, 
we call this the wage gap model since differences in market access show up in different 
                                                 
8 In Melchior (2008b) we show that the equation can be solved in some special cases but the results are not very 
user-friendly so we have to rely mainly on simulation.  
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 379 – East-West Integration and ... 
 18
 
nominal wages. In addition, real wages or welfare will be affected by the price level of each 
region, and welfare can be simply expressed as wi/Pi.  
 In the following, we will use this model as a tool to derive predictions about how 
European integration and other changes in trade costs may affect the income distribution in 
Europe. In Melchior (2008b), the model and the calculations are explained and discussed in 
greater detail, and the model is compared to a model with strong trade effects (the home 
market effect model of Krugman 1980). The latter may be considered as an extreme 
“representative” of a broader class of models, including NEG models, that rely on net trade or 
specialisation effects. It turns out that the welfare results in the two models are closely 
correlated but the specialisation or net trade effects in the latter sometimes differ 
considerably from other results. The nominal wage effects in the wage gap model are more 
closely correlated with the welfare results. This was checked for a variety of scenarios and 
especially for the reduction in spatially related trade costs (such as transport costs), the two 
models may give rather different predictions. The welfare results are however still similar, 
and this may suggest that the nominal and real wage effects in the wage gap model are of a 
more general nature than some of the net trade effects in the home market effect model.  
 The wage gap model has the property that wage differences are reduced 
monotonically when trade barriers come down. Hence there is no U-shape in the sense that 
differences first increase and then fall as barriers are reduced. Furthermore, there are no 
“bifurcations” or multiple equilibria; the model has a determinate solution.  This is a deliberate 
choice for two reasons: First, we are to solve a highly non-linear model with many unknowns, 
so we need a tractable model. Analysis of bifurcations and break points can be demanding 
even with two regions, and with 90 regions (the number we use) the number of potential 
equilibria could be daunting.  Secondly, we have seen from Figure 2 that the economic 
geography of Europe is a relatively smooth surface and we want a model with a continuous 
scale of outcomes rather than catastrophic agglomeration in a few regions.  
 For model simulations with many regions, it is important that the model is well-
behaved in the sense that it has a positive and economically meaningful solution. The home 
market effect model can easily be generalised to many regions, but there is positive 
production of manufactured goods in all regions only for a range of parameter values (see 
e.g. Helpman and Krugman 1985, Chapter 10). In a setting with many regions, this range is 
quite limited, since some region will be “deindustrialised” even for quite high levels of trade 
costs. The wage gap model is much better in this sense, and in the simulations undertaken, 
we obtain positive and economically meaningful outcomes in all cases. 
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3.2. Some simulation results 
 
In order to create a stylised spatial pattern where computations are technically 
manageable and results are easy to interpret, we chose to use a rectangular grid with 9 
countries and 90 regions.9 This is shown in Figure 6, where the solid-line squares and 
rectangles represent countries and each dot inside represents a region. Each region is 
assumed to have the same population size. 
 
Figure 6: A stylised European space with 90 regions
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Longitude
La
tit
ud
e
   W1
   W2
 
      W4
     C1
      C2
    E1
      E2
      W3
      E3
 
 
While the map is highly stylized, the idea is to capture aspects of the true European 
space. The four countries W1-W4 to the left represent the “old EU” or Western Europe 
whereas C1-C2 represent the “new members” or Central Europe. Eastern Europe is 
represented by E1-E3, of which one (E1) is a large, long and narrow country which is meant 
to capture some dimensions of Russia. E2 could in terms of geographic position resemble 
Turkey or Ukraine and E3 might represent Eurasian countries further east. The 90-region 
landscape has distinct North-South and even more East-West dimensions; there is a 
sufficiently rich regional structure inside each country, and we have a sufficient number of 
countries to study different integration scenarios, and their impact on insiders and outsiders.  
The map in Figure 6 captures some aspects of the true European space but we should 
nevertheless be aware of its limitations: 
- There is no outside world so the model will tend to overestimate the isolation of regions at 
the borders of the landscape. Given that e.g. regions in the Russian Far East are now 
benefiting from more intensive trade with China, USA and others, this is a limitation.  
                                                 
9 It was tried with true regional coordinates but the number of regions in the wider Europe is then more than 400 
at the NUTS2 level of classification. This creates more technical difficulties and this option was left as a possibility 
in future research. 
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- The landscape is stylized and misses many features of true geography, which has more 
countries, oceans, lakes, mountains, climatic differences and so on. Especially the North-
South dimension is limited and allows limited analysis of e.g. EU enlargement towards 
the South and North. This is however deliberate since our focus here is particularly on the 
East-West dimension; in the lights of the patterns of change we have shown earlier. 
A core feature of the approach used here is that we include some trade costs that are 
a function of distance, and others that are independent of distance. We call the first spatial or 
distance-dependent trade costs, and the second non-spatial or distance-independent. As 
shown by Melchior (2000), see also Behrens et al. (2007); when the two types are present 
simultaneously one obtains qualitatively new effects on the spatial distribution of activity or 
incomes that are not present when each is considered in isolation. In the model simulations, 
trade costs always include a spatial as well as a non-spatial component. 
We may think of spatial trade costs as transport costs, and non-spatial trade costs as 
“trade policy”. This is however not fully clear and it could also be the case that policy-shaped 
barriers or regulations have a spatial dimension. In the European context, the European 
internal market is a large-scale project containing thousands of reforms, of which some may 
be spatial and others non-spatial. For example, if geographical distance also reflects 
institutional similarity, standards and regulations could be more similar in countries and 
regions that are close to each other. The relationship between transport costs and distance is 
also not straightforward: while e.g. the costs of road transportation in Europe may be 
monotonously increasing with distance, this may not be so clear for long-distance sea freight. 
In the analysis, trade costs represent distribution costs in general, and it is an empirical issue 
which trade costs are spatial and non-spatial, and which are politically determined and which 
are not.  
 In the model simulations, trade costs always include a spatial as well as a non-spatial 
component. Spatial trade costs are present within as well as between nations. We simply use 
distances in the rectangular grid (Figur 6) and scale it with some factor. Next, we assume 
that there are non-spatial trade costs present between all regions, also within nations. We 
use three levels; within nations (tdomestic), between regions in different nations but within the 
same trade bloc (trta, where the rta subscript refers to some regional trade agreement), and 
between regions in different nations that have made no special integration agreement (tmfn, 
where mfn refers to Most Favoured Nation). We assume tdomestic<trta<tmfn and for simplicity we 
let the level for regional integration be mid-way between the domestic and MFN barriers. If 
we had allowed tdomestic=trta countries would not exist any more. Since international trade costs 
are always higher than the domestic ones, countries continue to matter in all scenarios.   
We run simulations with different levels of trade costs in order to check whether levels 
matter. But since there is no “U-effect” in the NEG sense described above, the level does not 
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matter too much for the qualitative results. We therefore report here results only for 
simulations with medium-level trade costs. In this case, non-spatial trade costs are 10% 
(domestically), 20% (in regional trade agreements) and 30% (between countries without 
RTA’s). In addition, there are distance-related trade costs ranging from 3.5% (to the 
neighbour region) to 50% (for the maximum distance). In this case, average trade costs of all 
kinds, spatial and non-spatial, is about 45%. Considering that Anderson and van Wijnkoop 
(2003) found that total trade costs broadly defined, including distribution costs, could be as 
high as 170% of the production price, this is not very high. 
We start with a base case with no regional integration, and then proceed to a 
scenario with Western integration (WEST), where the countries W1-W4 reduce non-spatial 
trade costs between them from 30 to 20%. In order to present the results in a compact and 
easily accessible way, we report results along the 2nd latitude, i.e. along the line running 
through the centre of countries W2, W4, C2, E2 and E3; including 15 of the 90 regions in our 
landscape. More details and a richer picture are shown in Melchior (2008b), including tables 
with the numbers involved as well as sensitivity analysis.  
In Figures 7a and 7b, we show income/welfare levels and changes in the WEST 
scenario. In order to illustrate to what extent the simulated income distribution matches the 
real-world pattern observed in Figure 2, Figure 7a shows nominal and real wage averages by 
longitude in the simulation model. Hence each data point is an average of six observations at 
each longitude. 
 
Figure 7a: Income levels in WEST scenario 
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Hence the simulated income distribution is inverse U-shaped, as in Figure 2, and it 
also matches by predicting a higher income level in the western countries. Observe the 
“agglomeration shadow” in country C2: being outside but close to the integrated bloc is a 
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disadvantage. This is demonstrated even more clearly in Figure 7b which shows the income 
changes compared to the base case without integration. 
Figure 7b: WEST scenario: Changes from 
base case For regions along the second latitude
‐1.5
‐1
‐0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
%
 c
ha
ng
e
Real wage
Nominal wage
W2 W4 C2 E2 E3
 
 
Hence Western integration creates a welfare gain for the integrating countries and a 
slight loss for those outside. This “agglomeration shadow” aspect of integration is well known 
from new trade theory models of regional integration; see e.g. the survey of Baldwin and 
Venables (1995). In such models, however, this discrimination effect corresponds to a net 
trade effect; there is “production shifting” whereby the trade bloc increases its net exports of 
manufactured goods. In the wage gap model, there is only one sector so there is no export 
surplus, and no net trade effects (although the trade volume is affected). The “welfare 
shifting”, as we may call it, is therefore caused by changes in nominal wages and price 
levels, due to lower trade costs. For the integrating countries, there is an increase in trade. 
Another new feature of the results shown here is due to the disaggregation of 
countries into regions: The impact of integration varies across regions within each country. 
Integration creates centralisation in the new trade bloc, and central regions gain more than 
the peripheries. Outside the trade bloc, the “agglomeration shadow” bites harder for regions 
close to the border of the new bloc.  
The WEST scenario is intended to represent the pre-1990 situation with integration in 
Western Europe. Later, the EU internal market has been established; Western and Central 
Europe have been integrated through the Europe Agreements between EU and Central 
European countries, other free trade agreements (e.g. between EFTA and Central Europe), 
and recently EU enlargement. Furthermore, there was liberalisation within the WTO and 
unilateral liberalisation by some Eastern European countries (e.g. Ukraine). According to our 
terminology, these reforms would reduce non-spatial trade costs. In addition, there could 
have been a reduction of spatial trade costs, either as a consequence of the European 
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internal market or because of improved transport supply. EU monetary integration could also 
have had an impact. 
In order to capture the spatial impact of these reforms, we show three different 
scenarios:  
- WIDER is the extension of the western trade bloc to include Central Europe. 
- WTO represents multilateral liberalisation, reducing tmfn from 30 to 25%. Observe that trta 
in this case stays unchanged at 20% so there is “preference erosion” by which the margin 
of preference for the trade bloc is reduced. 
- SPATIAL represents a reduction in spatial trade costs by half. We assume that this 
applies between all regions in Figure 6.10 Hence the maximum level of distance-related 
trade costs is now 25%.  
In all the three cases, we show changes in nominal and real income from scenario 
WEST. The results are presented in Figures 8-10. When interpreting the results, observe that 
the scale of each reform is not comparable: the percentage-point reduction in trade costs is 
largest in SPATIAL and smallest in WTO. Hence since we have not corrected for the “size of 
the shock”, one should look at the patterns rather than the absolute magnitude of the effects. 
 
Figure 8: WIDER European integration: 
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10 Later, we revert to a scenario where the reduction in spatial trade costs is higher in Western Europe. 
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Figure 9: General trade liberalisation 
(WTO scenario): Changes from WEST 
For regions along the second latitude
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Figure 10: Reduced distance costs 
(SPATIAL): Changes from WEST 
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An important message from these results is that different forms of trade liberalisation 
have quite distinct and different spatial effects. Hence there is no unambiguous rule telling 
how international integration affects domestic regions: this varies across scenarios. Whether 
it creates more or less regional inequality inside countries also depends on the initial 
situation. For example, western regions in W2 were initially worse off and therefore regional 
inequality in W2 increases in Figures 8 and 9 while it is reduced in Figure 10.  
 Turning to the results, we observe: 
- In the WIDER scenario, the results for WEST are just moved one step eastward: The 
Central European countries obtain a large gain by being taken from the “agglomeration 
shadow” into the trade bloc, and the shadow is moved one step further east. The former 
WEST bloc also gains from widening. Interestingly, the gain is larger for regions close to 
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the new members, so there is no reason for incumbents to fear the competition from the 
newcomers.11 Eastern Europe however loses from WIDER, but quite modestly. 
- All countries and regions gain welfare from general trade liberalisation (WTO), but 
countries and regions outside the existing WEST bloc gain more. The reason is the 
“preference erosion” that eliminates some of the integration advantages obtained by the 
western countries. For this reason, the gain from WTO is also larger for Central Europe, 
which is more harmed by being excluded from WEST. There is a modest nominal wage 
reduction for the western countries, but this is more than compensated for by lower prices 
so there is a welfare gain. 
- When distance-related trade costs are reduced in SPATIAL, it is generally to the benefit 
of the peripheries, so the change has indeed a U-shape; although the story behind is 
quite different from the NEG version. SPATIAL weakens the impact of geography. In real 
Europe as well as the simulations, there is a gravity-like central agglomeration with higher 
income in central areas. When the disadvantage of being peripheral is reduced, this 
centralisation pattern is reversed. In the central areas of the rectangular plain, there is 
even a nominal wage reduction. 
Since the spatial patterns vary strongly across scenarios, there are no universal 
predictions. Hence one may not assume generally that “western regions in Central Europe 
will gain more from integration” or that “regions with a greater market potential will gain 
more”. While such expectations have been used as a platform for research, our results 
suggest that the appropriate hypothesis depends on the specific integration scenario as well 
as the initial income of regions. As noted above, general predictions about how international 
integration will affect domestic regional inequality are not warranted, for similar reasons. 
Do any of the scenarios help us understand the U-shaped pattern of growth shown in 
Figures 3-5? Considering the shape, our first bet would be SPATIAL, given the similar U 
shape in Figure 9. A caveat is that the minimum of the U-curve for SPATIAL is in Central 
Europe, while in real Europe (as in Figure 5) it is in Western Europe, corresponding to W3-
W4 in our model. This is however only a technical issue and not a strong objection: The 
location of the minimum point in the simulation could easily be changed by technical 
adjustments to the model (we will show this later).  
Therefore, the SPATIAL scenario is a candidate explanation for the observed change 
in Europe’s east-west geography. This is however only a suggestion; more specific evidence 
is needed to draw a conclusion. This tentative suggestion is nevertheless surprising, given 
that we would expect wider European integration to be a more dominating force during the 
time period studied. The WIDER scenario however captures only reductions in non-spatial 
                                                 
11 As seen from the Appendix, Figure A2, there is a nominal wage reduction for all the former members, but the 
price level reduction is sufficient to secure a welfare gain, as shown in Figure 8. 
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trade costs, and it could be the case that the EU internal market actually also changes the 
distance-related costs. Institutional convergence, improved infrastructure and scale 
economies in the transport sector are potential explanations. The EU internal market is a 
massive institutional reform, creating institutional convergence across European countries. It 
contains thousands of reforms and regulations. If geographically not-too-distant countries 
initially had more similar institutions (e.g. the Nordic countries), institutional harmonisation 
could reduce the impact of distance (by making e.g. the Nordic countries and Italy more 
similar). While the internal market was established in 1992, it is plausible to believe that the 
implementation takes time and the full effects could appear during the period studied here, 
i.e. 1995-2005. According to Herderschee and Qiao (2007) the impact of the Europe 
Agreements between the EU and Central Europe, which were established in the early 1990s, 
would take 15 years to materialise. Given the complexity of the internal market reform, it 
would be plausible to expect that its impact would materialise over a long period. Regional 
transfers could also matter; if the magnitude of such transfers is inversely related to income 
levels (and these have a spatial profile as in Figure 2). For Western Europe, monetary 
integration could also be a candidate explanation. 
One path towards obtaining more decisive evidence would be to undertake more 
research on the spatial characteristics of economic activity (trade, investment, budget 
transfers etc.) (see e.g. Anderson and Yotov 2008 for an interesting recent contribution on 
gravity and border effects). Another research option, which we shall pursue here, is to derive 
more detailed but still macro-level predictions from the model scenarios and check if they are 
supported by the data. In Section 4, we therefore examine whether growth differences and 
changes in inequality across regions within countries are in line with the model predictions. 
In the analysis, we will examine all three scenarios presented in Figures 8-10. Even if 
it would turn out that SPATIAL is relevant, we still know that widening of European 
integration as well as some WTO liberalisation have actually happened, so in real life we 
would expect to observe a pattern affected by various reforms that have occurred in the 
1995-2005 period.  
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4. Spatial inequality and growth differences across regions 
within European countries 
 
 
Is the spatial pattern of growth observed in Figures 2-5 driven by differences across 
countries only, or does it also apply within countries? It is evident that the pattern is to a large 
extent driven by cross-country differences, as shown in Melchior (2008a). Especially after 
2000, Central and Eastern European countries have on average grown faster, and this 
contributes to convergence. But are there also domestic growth differences within each 
country with a similar east-west gradient? For example; do growth differences across regions 
in France have an east-west gradient so that western regions grow faster? According to the 
simulation model, this should indeed be the case and if it is supported empirically, it could 
bring us one step further. We therefore proceed by deriving some of these implications, and 
check whether they are supported by the evidence. 
 We therefore proceed to an analysis where we test econometrically whether regional 
growth within each country has an east-west or north-south gradient, but also controlling for 
other types of spatial income or growth differences. As a point of departure, Table 2 shows 
the model predictions about whether real income growth will have an eastward or westward 
bias. 
 
Table 2: Will real income growth be higher in the east or 
west of a country? Predictions from model simulations 
Countries in simulation Scenario W1-W2 W3-W4 C1-C2 E1-E2 
WEST East West East East 
WIDER East East West East 
WTO East/Neutral East West West 
SPATIAL West West U-shaped East 
Explanatory note: “East” e.g. indicates that income growth is 
expected to be higher in the eastern parts of the relevant 
countries (shown in the column headings). 
 
As noted above, minimum growth in the SPATIAL scenario is obtained for Central 
European countries but we consider that an outcome where the U-shaped outcome occurs 
for W3-W4 would also be technically possible.  
As seen from Table 2, the predicted effects again vary across scenarios. If the 
SPATIAL scenario is to receive further support, we should find western gradients of income 
growth in western countries, and eastern gradients inside eastern countries, with a neutral/ 
U-shaped pattern in some intermediate range.  
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One possible method for analysing these country-level spatial effects would be to 
pool the data and allow constant terms and slopes to vary also across countries. 
Determinants of spatial patterns however vary considerably across countries and this 
variation is difficult to handle properly in pooled regressions.12 Furthermore; there is no 
common pan-European prediction about the signs of parameters so in one sense the pooled 
regression is inconsistent unless we have specific methods to address heterogeneity. Indeed 
heterogeneity is our research focus and not something that we want to “correct for” in order 
to derive “general law” about spatial change, for example by some econometric approach 
with general assumptions about the pattern of spatial autocorrelation. Since our model 
predicts heterogeneous outcomes rather than some general law about spatial change, we 
address the issues by means of country-level regressions.  
The number of observations at the country level is on average 49 but varies from 5 to 
348, and for five countries it is 10 or below. We therefore drop six countries with 12 regional 
observations or less. For some other countries with more but still few observations, 
regressions are not that reliable but we nevertheless include them in the analysis. Hence we 
will examine spatial gradients of regional growth in 22 countries. For Germany, we also 
report results for West and East separately. Given our interest in the east-west gradient of 
growth, we include longitude (LON) in the analysis, and also latitude (LAT) in order to 
examine north-south effects.  
In addition to our examination of causes of spatial income change, the analysis also 
adds to the descriptive accounting of European regional inequality, by quantifying changes 
that are not captured by standard measures of regional inequality such as the Gini or Theil 
indexes. These indexes measure overall inequality without addressing geographical 
redistribution of income. For example; if there is a relative increase in the west and a relative 
decline east in some country, the Gini may be unchanged even if there has been a 
substantial change in the spatial income distribution. The analysis here therefore adds a new 
dimension compared to earlier analysis of regional inequality in Europe, such as Förster et 
al. (2003), Römisch (2003) or Melchior (2008a).13  
Analysing east-west and north-south gradients of the growth pattern would however 
be too limited since spatial growth inequality could be caused by other factors. In the 
empirical analysis, we therefore try to control for such aspects. 
                                                 
12 Also in a growth regression framework, there is a parallel problem with convergence across the EU (i.e. poor 
countries or regions grow faster), but variable outcomes within countries, with divergence between regions in a 
majority of countries (see Melchior 2008a). This variation is difficult to capture accurately in pooled regressions. 
13 Landesmann and Römisch (2006, 5) maintain that income per capita levels are relatively higher in the western 
border regions of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, and to some extent Romania, and the 
authors attribute this to market potential (proximity to the EU-15 market) as well as foreign direct investment. 
More analysis of the issue is however not presented. 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 379 – East-West Integration and ... 
 29
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, higher income levels and growth in capital regions is 
a common feature (see e.g. Brülhart and Koenig 2006, Landesmann and Römisch 2006, 
Melchior 2008a). Countries with high regional inequality also have agglomeration in capital 
regions, so there may be a core-peripery pattern that is quite distinct from the east-west or 
north-south geographical patterns that we have examined. Melchior (2008b) shows model 
simulations with a hub-and-spoke pattern inside countries, where capital regions act as hubs 
for the foreign trade of peripheral regions. In this case, east-west growth differences tend to 
be modified since the peripheral regions cannot exploit their proximity to foreign markets. For 
example, according to this regions in western Poland cannot exploit their proximity to the EU-
15 market so they remain peripheral and gains from integration accrue disproportionately to 
the capital region.   In order to capture capital region dominance in the empirical analysis, we 
include the distance of each region to the capital (CAP) as a variable. 
In the economic geography literature, a common theme is also that market potential 
or the proximity to markets can be a determinant of growth. Regarding international markets, 
the idea here is to capture that indirectly through the longitude and latitude variables. 
Domestically, there may however also be such a market potential effect. We capture this 
through the variable CORE, which is the distance from each region to an economic centre 
point. This is calculated as the GDP-weighted average of coordinates (longitude and latitude) 
for all regions in each country.14  
In some countries, the capital of a country is also close to the economic centre point 
so that CAP and CORE are highly correlated. This is however not always the case, and in 
some cases the correlation is 0.5 or lower. This is the case for e.g. Poland and Ukraine. 
Furthermore, capitals or economic centre points may be located to the east, west, north or 
south of a country and in that case they will be correlated with LON or LAT. For example, 
Austria, Ireland, Lithuania and Poland have eastern capitals and CAP is then highly (and 
negatively) correlated with LON. Similarly, high positive correlations between CAP and LON 
are observed for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Western Germany (where we use Bonn as the 
capital), Norway, Russia and Turkey, due to their western capitals. Unless we take this into 
account, we may mix up geographical east-west effects with the growth of capital regions. 
For example, it is commonly assumed that there is a strong capital city effect in Russia, but 
when the east-west dimension is taken into account, we will see from later results that this is 
not such a robust result any more. 
In Table A2 in the Appendix, we show the most relevant correlations between the four 
variables LON, LAT, CAP and CORE. Table A2 provides a guide for the regressions, by 
indicating where correlations are high and collinearity may represent a problem.  
                                                 
14 We also calculated population-weighted centre points but these are highly correlated with the GDP-weighted 
measure and give similar results. Results using the population-weighted measure are therefore not reported. 
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An issue is whether we should include initial income, as in growth regressions. For 
example, one might argue that growth in some region is due to its capital endowment and not 
its geographical location, and if we omit the initial income variable or some other variable 
reflecting the capital-labour ratio, the estimates would be biased. Against this, it could be 
argued that LON and LAT are not as such causes and we are not looking for causality in a 
standard sense: According to the model, LON and LAT are macro-level indicator variables 
reflecting a more complex underlying pattern driven by scale economies, imperfect 
competition and differences in trade costs. Hence we use LAT and LON to describe the 
spatial pattern of growth and check whether this spatial pattern conforms to the model. We 
start by using this latter approach; running regressions without the income variable. 
However, we also undertake regressions with initial income y0 included (in logs) in order to 
see how this affects the results.  
LON, LAT and CAP do not change over time and CORE changes only a little. For this 
reason, there is little to gain from a panel approach and we start by running country-level 
OLS regressions of the form  
 
gi = α + γ1 * LONi + γ2 * LATi + γ3 * CAPi + γ4 * COREi + εi                      (2) 
 
and later with ln(y0) added on the right hand side. This specification is linear in all variables. 
For LON and LAT a linear approximation seems plausible, since the range covered for each 
country is limited. For CAP and CORE it is less clear that a linear specification is the 
appropriate choice, and this is an empirical issue with little à priori guidance. The shape of  
spatial agglomeration around capitals or economic centres may not be a “pyramid” – as we 
assume in equation (2) – but bell-shaped or inverse U-shaped. If that is the case, equation 
(2) is mis-specified and the estimates may be biased. We try to avoid this by using, 
alternatively, the following two other specifications: 
 
gi = α + γ1 * LONi + γ2 * LATi + γ3 * ln(CAPi) + γ4 * ln(COREi) + εi       (3) 
 
gi = α + γ1 * LONi + γ2 * LATi + γ3 * CAPi  + γ5 * CAPi2 
           + γ4 * COREi + γ6 * COREi2 + εi                                                                            (4) 
 
Equation (3) is in logs while equation (4) adds quadratic terms for CAP and CORE in 
order to better capture the curvature of the core-periphery dimension.15  In the analysis, we 
try the three specifications above and report the specification with the highest adjusted R2. If 
some parameters are insignificant due to collinearity, we rerun the equations with some 
variables excluded. If different specifications give different results for LON and CAP, which 
                                                 
15 Since the capital region has CAP=0 and ln(0) is not defined we actually use ln(1+CAP) in equation (3). 
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we consider as variables of particular importance, we take this into account in the reporting 
of results. Hence if e.g. LON obtains a particular result only in one specification but not 
others, we examine further the reasons behind.16  
 The number of observations is low in some cases even if we have dropped some 
smaller countries. Especially for such countries, results may be unduly affected by outliers. 
We therefore also run robust regressions in all cases in order to check whether outliers 
unduly affect the results.17 In some cases where robust regression lead to a change in the 
conclusions, e.g. that a significant estimate becomes insignificant in the robust regressions, 
we report this. In some cases where the number of observations is small, this type of robust 
regression may not capture underlying problems with “leverage points”. We revert to this 
when reporting the results. 
 As noted, we also undertake regressions where the log of initial income is included as 
a right hand side variable. In Appendix Table A3, we report correlations between initial 
income and the four spatial variables used (LON, LAT, CAP, CORE).  In general, these 
correlations are lower than between the spatial variables, but in some cases, income levels 
have a strong spatial pattern. By using Tables A2 and A3, the interested reader may trace 
the economic geography of each country; i.e. where income is higher, where the economic 
mass is concentrated, the role of the capital, east-west and north-south dimensions. For 
each country we could tell a little story, but with the paper long already we leave that to the 
interested reader who may find information about specific countries of interest.    
In Appendix Tables A4 and A5, we report the results when average annual growth in 
GDP per capita is the dependent variable, without and with the initial income level (ln(y0)) 
included, respectively. 18  
As an alternative or supplement to per capita income growth as the dependent 
variable, other variables could be considered, such as wages, employment or prices. Such 
data are however generally not available at the NUTS3 level which we use in order to have a 
sufficient number of observations. We do however have population data, and these may be 
of interest due to migration and also since GDP per capita is affected by population change. 
Here we could imagine various mechanisms; e.g. that migration exceeds job growth so GDP 
per capita declines in spite of a growing economy; or economic decline causing population 
                                                 
16 The CAP and CORE variables may capture agglomeration related to one or two reference points in each 
country, depending on whether the two variables are highly correlated or not. If the two variables are highly 
correlated, we are essentially controlling for a “monocentric” pattern of agglomeration with one central location. 
This may not be appropriate since countries may have a hierarchy of agglomerations. Especially for larger 
countries such as Russia, this monocentricity may be a limitation of the analysis. It is however beyond the scope 
of this analysis to provide an in-depth analysis of “multicentric” patterns of agglomeration in each country. This is 
left as a task for future research. 
17 We use standard robust regressions as suggested by Huber (1973) and discussed in e.g. Maddala (1988); so-
called M regressions. Such regressions use iterative procedures and adjusted R2 is not appropriate as test 
statistics. R2 is reported by the SAS software output and is used instead, in the Appendix tables.  
18 We also tried the log of income per capita growth but this did not improve the fit so the growth rate was used.  
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decline and this adds to income per capita. As a check on whether such aspects matter, we 
run regressions with equation (3) using population growth as dependent variable. Here we 
also include initial income per capita in order to examine whether higher income drives 
population growth or migration. These results are reported in Table A6 in the Appendix. 
Tables A4-A6 contain many results and in order to facilitate the interpretation, Table 3 
sums up the main qualitative results, by indicating where results for each parameter were 
significantly positive or negative (blank cells indicating non-significant results). These 
concluding results are obtained after checking different specifications as well as robust 
regressions. While this problem is certainly present, it was nevertheless not as severe as we 
would expect from the correlations in Table A2. In some cases we nevertheless chose to 
drop one of the two variables, as shown in Tables A4 and A5.  
In Table 3, some borderline cases are marked with an asterisk, indicating some 
remaining uncertainty about the reliability of the estimates. There are also cases with high 
collinearity, for example when CAP and CORE are highly correlated, where it is hard to say 
whether one or the other is true, or which one of the two variables that should be dropped. 
For some countries with a low number of observations, results remain significant in spite of 
repeated checking, but we maintain some scepticism due to extreme results. This is 
especially the case for the Czech Republic, with a modest 14 observations. Visual inspection 
of the data suggests that there is a remaining problem with outliers that is not taken into 
account through the type of robust regressions used.  
In order to see how the results relate to our theoretical framework as well as earlier 
empirical results, Table 3 ranks countries according to longitude as in Figure A1 in the 
Appendix. As an exception, the Nordic countries are reported separately at the bottom of the 
table, since they are located far from the central east-west axis of Europe and have few 
significant spatial patterns. In the table, some of the most important results are marked with 
shaded areas. 
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Table 3: Summary of regressions on spatial determinants of income and population 
growth in European countries 
Explanatory notes: 
- For LON, LAT: E.g. “West” indicates higher growth in the west, equivalent to a significant 
negative estimate for LON, and “South” indicates higher growth in the south i.e. a significant 
negative estimate for LAT. 
- For CAP, CORE: “Yes” indicates an agglomeration effect with lower growth further away 
from the capital or economic centre point; i.e. a significantly negative parameter estimate. 
“Reverse” indicates a positive estimate which reflects higher growth further away from the 
capital or centre point. 
- For Y0: “Converge” indicates a significant negative estimates so poor regions grow faster; 
“Diverge” the opposite. 
Income per capita growth Population growth 
Countries 
(ranked by 
longitude) LON LAT CAP CORE Y0 LON LAT 
N 
Portugal      West  28 
UK   Yes    South 126 
Spain West South  Reverse  East South 47 
France West South  Reverse   South 99 
Belgium    Yes  East  42 
Netherlands West North  Yes    38 
Germany East South* Reverse* Yes Converge   414 
W. Germany East South  Yes Converge West South 348 
Italy East   Yes Converge  North 99 
E. Germany   Reverse Yes  West  66 
Austria  South  Yes  West  35 
Czech Rep. East* South* Yes* Reverse*  West*  14 
Croatia  South      21 
Poland   Yes     16 
Hungary   Yes     20 
Greece West* North* Yes Reverse* Converge   51 
Romania West  Yes   East  42 
Bulgaria   Yes  Converge East  28 
Ukraine  South* Yes*  Diverge West  27 
Turkey East North   Converge  South 79 
Russia    Reverse*  West South 79 
Nordic countries 
Norway        19 
Sweden   Yes    South 21 
Finland     Converge   19 
Note: Details are found in Tables A4-A6 in the Appendix. An asterisk indicates some remaining uncertainty about the 
reliability of estimates. 
 
From the Appendixes we observe that the average value of adjusted R2 is 0.20 for the 
regressions with per capita income growth as dependent variable but without initial income 
included. When initial income included, this average increases to 0.25. Including initial 
income however does not change the results very much, and most of the results in Table 3 
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are supported in both cases. When population is the dependent variable, average adjusted 
R2 is 0.28; indicating that population has even stronger spatial gradients than income 
change.  
 From Table 3, it is evident that we find significant spatial gradients in slightly less than 
half of the possible cases. The lack of a pattern in some countries is however also a relevant 
result, and in many cases there are plausible explanations why results may be insignificant. 
 For Western Europe from Spain to Italy, the results for LON are in conformity with our 
earlier results in Figures 3-5: Corresponding to this U-shape, there is a western gradient of 
regional growth within Spain, France and the Netherlands, and an Eastern gradient for West 
Germany (and Germany as a whole) and Italy.19 In the latter family, we also find the Czech 
Republic as a borderline case.  Figure 11 summarises this pattern.20  
 
Figure 11: East-west gradients of income growth 
Summary of results from country-level regressions 
Blue/dark=western, green/intermediate=eastern, light grey=not significant, white=not covered by 
analysis 
 
 
The North-South gradients summarised in Table 3 may suggest there is also 
decentralisation in the North-South direction; with a Northern gradient for the Netherlands 
and a southern gradient for Spain, France, West Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic. 
The results indicate that the “blue banana” is weakened and there is decentralisation 
                                                 
19 Redding and Sturm (2005) analysed Germany and concluded that unification promoted growth in the border 
regions between West and East Germany. We find an eastern gradient for West Germany but no western 
gradient for East Germany. Potentially, the unification effect observed could be linked to the alternative 
mechanism discussed here and not the impact of unification.  
20 Russia is not included in the graph but the results were insignificant. This also applies to Figure 12. 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 379 – East-West Integration and ... 
 35
 
compared to the formerly inverse U-shaped income distribution shown in Figure 2. 
Interestingly, this is combined with a systematic pattern of results for the CORE variables: 
Proximity to the domestic market potential is a driver for regional growth in Belgium, 
Netherland, Germany, Italy and Austria; whereas further west (in Spain and France) and east 
(in the Czech Republic) growth is higher away from the economic centres of gravity. Hence 
in the low-growth area of Figure 2, including Germany and Italy, domestic market potential 
plays an increasing role. This mechanism is not reflected in the model simulations, and we 
leave for further research to sort out the mechanisms behind this effect.   
Moving one step further east, or one step down in Table 3, to Central Europe, the 
pattern of results is completely changed: Now we find few east-west or north-south gradients 
of growth, and few significant results for CORE. On the other hand there are significant 
capital region effects for all countries covered in this range. This is shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: CAPITAL effects 
Summary of results from country-level regressions 
Blue/dark=CAPITAL effect, green/intermediate=reversed effect, light grey=not significant, white=not 
covered by analysis 
 
 
For the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine, 
there are significant negative estimates for CAP, indicating that regions further away from the 
capital have lower growth. Evidence on the role of capitals in Central Europe was also 
provided by Brülhart and Koenig (2006). Similar to our results, they find that capital region 
dominance is more important than proximity to EU markets. 
For Western Europe, the geographical pattern between and within countries are 
similar, but in Central Europe, the east-west gradient is driven by cross-country changes and 
not reflected in the domestic pattern of growth in these countries. As noted, this is in 
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conformity with the predictions when a hub-and-spoke effect within countries is introduced in 
the simulation model. For Central Europe, one possibility is that capital region effects 
eliminate the east-west patterns of growth observed in Figures 3-5, and expected according 
to the SPATIAL scenario. If this is true, the story is that integration drives growth in Central 
Europe, but the benefits accrue disproportionately to the capitals, due to the hub-and-spoke 
pattern.  
Another possible interpretation of the results for Central Europe is that different 
reforms have opposite impact on east-west trends so in sum, these cancel out. In Table 2, 
two of the scenarios (WIDER and WTO) predict a western gradient of growth across regions 
in Central Europe, whereas SPATIAL predicts an eastern gradient. The relative strength of 
either mechanism will then determine the outcome. In this perspective it may not be 
surprising that the east-west effects are weak and varying. In addition to the non-significant 
results in most cases, we find one border case with an eastern gradient (the Czech 
Republic), and two with a western gradient (Greece and Romania).  
For Romania, this is in line with the results of Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran (2004) 
who interpreted their results as indicating that proximity to the EU market would promote 
growth. In our framework, this corresponds to the WIDER scenario. Observe however that for 
Romania, there is an eastern gradient for population change and this seems to be driving the 
differences in GDP per capita growth. Hence higher income per capita growth in western 
Romania is not mainly because of high GDP growth, but because of more population decline 
in Western Romania. This suggests that the western gradient for income per capita in 
Romania may be explained by features not captured by our models.21 Hence it is possible 
that the trend in Romania is due to transition rather than integration. 
Turning finally to the eastern countries, we observe  
- a north-eastern gradient of growth in Turkey;  
- a capital region effect and a southern growth gradient for Ukraine; and 
- growth away from the economic central point in Russia.  
For Russia and Ukraine, the results on population growth are however stronger than 
results with per capita income as dependent variable, increasing adjusted R2 from 0.10 to 
0.48 for Russia, and from 0.27 to 0.51-0.59 for Ukraine. In Russia, population decline is 
lower in the south-west direction. Along with Andrienko and Guriev (2004), we find that 
population development in Russia is more favourable for regions with a higher initial income 
level (see Table A6). For Russia, it is also evident that the growth pattern is affected by the 
                                                 
21 East-west gradients for income per capita and population growth have opposite signs also for Spain, West 
Germany and the Czech Republic. For West Germany and Spain, there was higher population growth rather than 
less decline in areas with more income growth. From Table A6 in the Appendix, we find that population growth 
was higher in regions with initially higher income in the following cases: Czech Republic, Spain, France, Italy, 
Russia and Turkey. Hence in these countries, there was migration driven by income gaps. 
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natural resources and oil prices.22 It is also likely that for a vast country like Russia, testing 
for a monocentric agglomeration around the capital and the economic gravity point is a too 
simple approach and that more complex patterns of agglomeration should be considered. In 
Ukraine, there is a western gradient for population growth, due to faster population decline in 
the east of the country.  
The results for Eastern Europe do not provide convincing support for any of our 
model scenarios, and a possible interpretation is that in Eastern Europe, transition effects still 
dominate so the “invisible hand” of economic geography is still weak. One might interpret the 
north-east gradient of per capita growth in Turkey as evidence of an “agglomeration shadow” 
but we consider this as quite uncertain unless we obtain more systematic evidence to this 
effect. Hence on the whole, the results do not confirm the presence of an “agglomeration 
shadow” to the east.  
 
 
5. Summing up: A revised model scenario 
 
 
Throughout the empirical analysis, the model scenarios have helped us interpret the 
results. We have found evidence providing some support for the model predictions, but the 
pattern is complex, varying and we cannot declare a clear “winner”. This is to be expected: 
the world is complex, and economics should address this complexity rather than search for 
simple “universal laws” that may turn out to be evasive. 
 The empirical results suggest that elements from different model scenarios are 
relevant: the SPATIAL predictions are supported for Western Europe but for Central Europe, 
the pattern is more ambiguous. As a tentative summing-up of the analysis, we construct a 
“hybrid” model scenario which captures some of the observed empirical regularities. 
Departing from the WEST scenario, we add the following elements: 
- East-West integration as before, according to the WIDER scenario. 
- Hub-and-spoke patterns in all Central and Eastern European countries: Half the trade of 
each region has to be shipped via the capitals. This creates a “capital effect” in each 
country, in line with the regression results.  
- A reduction in spatial trade costs that is different in the three areas: 50% reduction within 
W1-W4, and 25% reduction for the trade within C1-C2, and their trade with the western 
countries. For the eastern countries, there is no reduction in the cost of distance. The 
                                                 
22 It would be appropriate to take this into account in the econometric analysis but in order to limit the length of 
this paper we leave this task for further research.  
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motivation for this pattern is that such a reduction is caused by the internal market, and 
integration is therefore deeper in the Western area. Monetary integration could also add 
to this effect. 
Combining these elements, Figure 13 shows the result, measured by the change from 
the WEST scenario. As before, we show the outcome along the 2nd latitude. 
 
Figure 13: A combined scenario: 
Changes from WEST 
For regions along the second latitude
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Here we have reproduced  
- the U-shape in Western Europe, due to deeper “spatial liberalisation” in the west;  
- the “skewed U-shape” from the real-world Figure 4b, with higher growth in Central 
Europe, due to the impact of wider integration; 
- a strong capital effect in Central and Eastern Europe, but no clear East-West difference 
inside the countries, due to the hub-and-spoke effects. 
Hence for West and Central Europe, this hybrid scenario reproduces the main observed 
pattern.  
As noted above, the empirical evidence for Ukraine, Turkey and Russia is more 
mixed so we cannot draw a clear conclusion concerning the relevance of the model 
predictions. However, correcting for natural resource income is necessary before we can 
draw firm conclusions about spatial effects in Russia. An extended analysis, beyond the 
scope of this paper, is required for this purpose.   
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6. Concluding comments 
 
 
In the paper, we have shown that along the east-west axis in Europe, there has been a 
sharp U- or V-shaped pattern of growth differentials across European regions, with the 
lowest growth at a longitude through West Germany and Italy, and higher growth to the west 
and to the east of this. We have used numerical model simulation and econometric analysis 
in order to explain this pattern, and our tentative assessment of the results is as follows:  
- In Western Europe, the east-west gradients of growth apply similarly inside as well as 
across countries, in line with the observed U-pattern. A possible explanation is that the 
implementation of the EU internal market during the period has implied institutional 
harmonisation across European countries in a way that has reduced the “cost of 
distance” and made Europe smaller. Given the complexity of the internal market reform, 
we expect that its strongest effect should be in Western Europe. After 2000, stronger 
growth in eastern parts of the EU-15 could also be driven by east-west integration. 
Monetary integration could also be a driving force for Western Europe. 
- For Central Europe, the U-pattern of growth differences applies across countries but not 
within them, and we find spatial east-west gradients of regional growth within countries 
only in a few cases. On the other hand there are strong capital region effects in all the 
countries covered by the analysis. Hence one possible explanation is that gains from 
integration accrue disproportionately to capitals, and this wipes out any east-west impact 
inside Central European countries. Another possible explanation is that reduced distance 
costs and wider regional integration have opposite impacts on regional growth, and this is 
why the net impact is weak or missing.  
- The Eastern European countries Ukraine and Russia are more remote and this may be a 
reason we do not find strong east-west gradients of income growth in these countries. 
We find a westward gradient of population change (due to less population decline in the 
west), but we interpret this as an effect of transition and not linked to the mechanisms 
studied in the model approach we have used. A north-east gradient of per capita income 
growth in Turkey could in principle be interpreted as evidence on an “agglomeration 
shadow” or even reduced distance costs, but with so limited evidence we are not able to 
draw clear conclusions on this. 
In the paper, we have combined descriptive analysis, model simulation and econometrics 
in order to shed light on the economic geography of Europe. Many of the results, theoretically 
as well as empirically, are new.  
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- To our knowledge, the U-shaped pattern of growth along Europe’s east-west axis has not 
been fully examined by earlier research.  
- Through model simulations, we have shown that different trade reforms may have very 
different effects on the spatial distribution of income. Using higher-dimensional numerical 
modelling, we have developed tools for examining such reforms and deriving more 
precise hypotheses for empirical work and interpretation of the results. Instead of looking 
for “general laws” about spatial change, predictions are specific and not universal. 
- Using the Harris (1954) concept of market potential, it has often been assumed that 
proximity to markets is an advantage for growth. We have shown, theoretically and 
empirically, that this is the case sometimes but not generally. A possible extension of the 
analysis could be to derive these implications for the market potential concept. 
- The EU internal market was established during the early 1990s but its implementation is 
gradual and its full impact has not been measured. Our results suggest, as one possible 
explanation which should be examined further with more specific evidence, that the 
internal market has had a massive impact on the economic geography of Europe, 
especially Western Europe, by “making Europe smaller”.  
- It is not new that European integration has promoted growth in Central Europe, but the 
analysis sheds new light on the (partly missing) regional impact of this inside countries as 
well as the role of capital regions in Central and Eastern Europe; comprehensively for 
most of the countries involved.   
- While earlier research has analysed the extent of overall regional inequality within 
countries, inequality measures such as Gini or Theil indexes, or growth regressions, are 
insensitive to the geographical dimensions of inequality. The results here provide a 
mapping of east-west and north-south gradients of economic growth and population 
change across European countries. 
In the theoretical as well as the empirical work undertaken in the paper, a limitation is 
that the impact of global competition has not been accounted for. The relative economic 
decline of the former powerhouses of Europe, in Germany and Italy, could also be affected 
by competition from e.g. Asia, and in further research this should be examined further. In the 
analysis, we have also drawn tentative conclusions based on resemblance of macro-
simulations and empirical results. For example, we have shown that the pattern of growth in 
Western Europe conforms with the SPATIAL scenario (halving the distance-related trade 
costs) but we have presented no direct evidence showing that the cost of distance has 
actually been reduced. Because of this, all our main conclusions are tentative and should be 
underpinned by further research providing more specific evidence. Nevertheless, we believe 
that such a macro-based approach is necessary, at least as a starting point, if we are to 
capture the “invisible hands” operating on the economic geography of Europe. European 
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integration is the sum of thousands of reforms and regulations, and a birds-eye view is 
necessary in order to trace the combined impact of all these reforms. The bird should 
however not fly in too thin air, and through our modelling approach we have attempted to 
develop a “geographical economics” approach with sufficient specificity for the empirical 
analysis. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Longitudes of European countries
Portugal
Ireland
United Kingdom
Spain
France
Belgium
Netherlands
Germany West
Italy
Germany East
Austria
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Norway
Sweden
Croatia
Poland
Slovakia
Hungary
Lithuania
Greece
Latvia
Romania
Bulgaria
Finland
Estonia
Range for longitudes for regions in each country
-10            -5             0              5            10           15            20            25           30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 379 – East-West Integration and ... 
 47 
 
Table A1: Data coverage 
Countries Years covered 
Classifi-
cation Data source Notes 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Rep., 
Germany, Spain, Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, UK 
(18 countries) 
1995-2005 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio 
- France: Overseas territories dropped. 
- Spain: Canary and Balearic Islands dropped. 
- Portugal: Ceuta, Melilla dropped. 
- Germany: Sachsen-Anhalt missing. 
- Germany: Split in West and East in some of the analysis. 
- UK: No data for “Highlands and Islands”. 
- A few other regions dropped due to missing data: Belgium 
2, Germany 1, Italy 8, Netherlands 2, UK 2. 
Bulgaria, Latvia 1996-2005 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio  
Estonia 1997-2005 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio  
Poland 1995-2005 NUTS 2 Eurostat/Regio NUTS3 data limited, NUTS2 data are used 
Romania 1998-2005 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio  
Croatia 1995-2000 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio  
Norway 1995 and 1997-2005 NUTS 3 
Eurostat/Regio 
Statistics Norway 
Nation-level GDP data from Regio but regional allocation is 
calculated using regional GDP data from Statistics Norway 
Turkey 1995-2001 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio  
Russia 1995-2005 National Rosstat Annual publications: Russian regions 
Ukraine 1996-2005 National SSCU State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 
Denmark, Iceland, Switzerland    Regional data not available from Eurostat 
Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg, 
Liechtenstein    Not included in analysis 
Note: For more information about the number and size of regions etc., see Melchior (2008a). On NUTS classification, see Eurostat (2007). 
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Table A2: Correlations between spatial variables 
Variables:  
• LON: Longitude of regions at levels (at NUTS3 level, except for Poland, Russia, 
Ukraine where NUTS2 or national classification has been used). 
• LAT: Latitude 
• CAP: Distance from region centre point to country capital. For West Germany, 
Bonn has been used. 
• CORE: Distance to the country’s economic centre point, measured as GDP-
weighted average of regional coordinates. 
In the table, standard Pearson correlations are reported, with P values below estimate. 
The number of observations is as in Tables A4 and A5. 
 
 LON-LAT 
LON-
CAP 
LON-
DEC 
LAT-
CAP 
LAT-
CORE 
CAP-
CORE 
Austria 0.39 -0.98 -0.74 -0.54 -0.32 0.77 
  0.0202 <.0001 <.0001 0.0007 0.0601 <.0001 
Belgium -0.51 0.13 0.14 -0.48 -0.53 1.00 
  0.0006 0.4021 0.3695 0.0015 0.0003 <.0001 
Bulgaria 0.21 0.95 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.53 
  0.2928 <.0001 0.0819 0.1294 0.1110 0.0035 
Czech Republic -0.32 0.74 -0.01 -0.47 -0.10 0.56 
  0.2571 0.0023 0.9650 0.0936 0.7248 0.0358 
Germany -0.27 0.82 0.37 -0.17 0.06 0.79 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0013 0.2725 <.0001 
Germany East -0.27 -0.32 -0.38 -0.19 0.30 0.86 
  0.0293 0.0078 0.0015 0.1201 0.0132 <.0001 
Estonia 0.04 0.71 0.60 -0.59 -0.43 0.86 
  0.9515 0.1797 0.2879 0.2924 0.4678 0.0643 
Spain 0.03 0.12 -0.39 -0.05 -0.13 0.83 
  0.8554 0.4093 0.0061 0.7520 0.3975 <.0001 
Finland 0.17 0.34 0.27 0.97 0.86 0.90 
  0.4900 0.1593 0.2568 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
France -0.15 0.20 0.13 -0.90 -0.59 0.84 
  0.1487 0.0486 0.2214 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Greece -0.25 0.13 0.44 0.32 -0.16 0.85 
  0.0812 0.3586 0.0014 0.0234 0.2738 <.0001 
Croatia -0.08 0.38 0.35 -0.84 -0.69 0.93 
  0.7243 0.0924 0.1156 <.0001 0.0006 <.0001 
Hungary 0.39 0.04 -0.01 -0.25 -0.11 0.98 
  0.0890 0.8542 0.9622 0.2960 0.6584 <.0001 
Ireland 0.19 -0.95 -0.62 -0.26 0.02 0.73 
  0.6522 0.0003 0.0998 0.5295 0.9617 0.0392 
Italy -0.73 -0.23 0.51 0.09 -0.71 0.56 
 <.0001 0.0199 <.0001 0.3513 <.0001 <.0001 
Lithuania -0.30 -0.93 -0.39 0.55 0.34 0.48 
 0.3941 <.0001 0.2611 0.0973 0.3377 0.1564 
Latvia -0.11 0.42 0.25 -0.24 -0.22 0.98 
 0.8403 0.4116 0.6272 0.6421 0.6730 0.0007 
Netherlands 0.49 0.58 0.55 -0.09 0.30 0.85 
 0.0019 0.0002 0.0003 0.6050 0.0719 <.0001 
Norway 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.94 0.87 0.97 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Poland -0.19 -0.74 0.01 -0.06 0.31 0.46 
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 LON-LAT 
LON-
CAP 
LON-
DEC 
LAT-
CAP 
LAT-
CORE 
CAP-
CORE 
 0.4836 0.0011 0.9834 0.8350 0.2378 0.0740 
Portugal 0.21 0.53 0.28 0.75 0.04 0.57 
 0.2874 0.0038 0.1566 <.0001 0.8580 0.0014 
Romania -0.16 -0.52 -0.18 0.80 0.27 0.63 
 0.3162 0.0004 0.2635 <.0001 0.0801 <.0001 
Russia -0.03 0.97 0.83 -0.14 -0.14 0.88 
 0.7930 <.0001 <.0001 0.2203 0.2247 <.0001 
Sweden 0.52 0.04 0.36 0.46 0.65 0.92 
 0.0153 0.8707 0.1059 0.0351 0.0014 <.0001 
Slovenia 0.60 0.59 0.13 0.54 0.21 0.83 
 0.0401 0.0437 0.6941 0.0683 0.5137 0.0008 
Slovakia 0.53 1.00 0.65 0.61 0.28 0.62 
 0.1721 <.0001 0.0839 0.1081 0.5002 0.1020 
Turkey -0.13 0.76 0.85 -0.16 -0.15 0.99 
 0.2633 <.0001 <.0001 0.1469 0.1991 <.0001 
United Kingdom -0.43 -0.78 -0.57 0.86 0.55 0.78 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Ukraine -0.30 0.26 -0.55 -0.64 0.02 0.50 
 0.1224 0.1849 0.0029 0.0004 0.9367 0.0073 
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Table A3: Correlation between initial income (y0) and other variables  
Note: P values below estimate. Number of observations as in Table A4.  
Country LON LAT CAP CORE 
Austria -0.30 0.04 0.22 0.26 
  0.0782 0.8112 0.2072 0.1353 
Belgium -0.09 0.36 -0.35 -0.36 
  0.5497 0.0190 0.0240 0.0195 
Bulgaria -0.15 -0.07 -0.28 -0.12 
  0.4429 0.7246 0.1496 0.5508 
Czech Republic -0.23 0.11 -0.53 -0.25 
  0.4320 0.7204 0.0534 0.3810 
Germany -0.21 -0.23 0.11 0.09 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.0254 0.0713 
Germany West 0.00 -0.14 0.01 0.00 
  0.9711 0.0084 0.8366 0.9694 
Germany East 0.01 0.07 -0.22 -0.18 
  0.9251 0.5770 0.0704 0.1557 
Spain 0.62 0.58 -0.05 -0.38 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.7344 0.0080 
Finland -0.22 -0.39 -0.40 -0.07 
  0.3553 0.0996 0.0886 0.7772 
France 0.03 0.25 -0.35 -0.22 
  0.7707 0.0142 0.0005 0.0306 
Greece 0.11 -0.16 -0.37 -0.32 
  0.4227 0.2719 0.0067 0.0217 
Hungary -0.33 -0.06 -0.36 -0.31 
  0.1493 0.7987 0.1144 0.1896 
Italy -0.75 0.86 0.11 -0.66 
 <.0001 <.0001 0.2957 <.0001 
Netherlands -0.31 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
 0.0610 0.3729 0.3781 0.3790 
Norway -0.16 -0.24 -0.28 -0.20 
 0.5125 0.3213 0.2396 0.4150 
Poland -0.50 0.08 0.03 -0.26 
 0.0503 0.7806 0.9061 0.3247 
Portugal -0.57 -0.46 -0.53 -0.06 
 0.0016 0.0146 0.0039 0.7432 
Romania -0.12 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 
 0.4591 0.2321 0.2487 0.2846 
Russia 0.29 0.53 0.22 0.12 
 0.0092 <.0001 0.0551 0.2833 
Sweden 0.23 0.21 -0.07 0.14 
 0.3259 0.3515 0.7634 0.5593 
Turkey -0.68 0.13 -0.51 -0.57 
 <.0001 0.2551 <.0001 <.0001 
United Kingdom 0.23 -0.13 -0.26 -0.13 
 0.0087 0.1524 0.0039 0.1451 
Ukraine 0.53 0.21 -0.36 -0.61 
 0.0043 0.2944 0.0649 0.0008 
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Table A4: Country-level regressions on spatial determinants of regional growth in GDP per capita, Europe 1995-2005 
- Equation A: Distance to capitals and economic centre points in logs (equation (2) in the main text). 
- Equation B: Linear distances to capitals and economic centre points (equation (3) in the main text). 
- Equation C: Linear distances to capitals and economic centre points and quadratic terms added (equation (4) in the main text). 
- Regressions are for change between first and last years during 1995-2005 except for A2 and C2, which are for the last half of this period (2000-2005). 
- Robust regressions are reported where they affect conclusions about the significance level of estimates. For robust regressions R2 is reported. 
 
Country Equation  Const. LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) CAP CAP2 CORE CORE2 Adj. R2 N 
Austria C Est. 36.9 0.09 -0.70     -0.0109 0.0000 0.19 35 
  P values 0.0013 0.3985 0.0039     0.0552 0.0645   
Belgium A Est. -11.0 -0.22 0.34 0.77 -1.22     0.28 42 
  P values 0.5414 0.1046 0.3152 0.1043 0.0505       
Bulgaria A Est. 1.5 0.29 0.00 -0.63      -0.02 28 
  P values 0.9467 0.3552 0.9953 0.1317        
 A2 Est. 44.5 0.26 -0.93 -0.89      0.16 28 
  P values 0.0822 0.4647 0.1186 0.0611        
Czech Rep. C Est. 380.1 25.34 -15.03   -0.0410 -0.0026  0.0027 0.86 14 
  P values 0.0104 0.0174 0.0142   <.0001 0.0212  0.0183   
Germany A Est. 5.1 0.21 -0.05 0.16 -0.40     0.12 414 
  P values 0.0709 <.0001 0.1780 0.2930 0.0004       
West Germany B Est. 6.8 0.18 -0.10     -0.0023  0.13 348 
  P values 0.0001 <.0001 0.0035     0.0002    
East Germany A Est. 4.0 -0.16 0.04 0.86 -0.88     0.08 66 
  P values 0.6498 0.4076 0.7979 0.0063 0.0324       
 A robust Est. 8.10 -0.09 -0.13 0.34 0.34     0.10 66 
  P values 0.3184 0.6212 0.3493 0.2372 0.3614       
Spain A Est. 5.1 -0.03 -0.06  0.49     0.41 47 
  P values 0.0009 0.2108 0.0609  <.0001       
 C2 Est. 3.6 -0.24 -0.01     0.0062 0.0000 0.50 47 
  P values 0.0866 <.0001 0.7725     0.0627 0.1296   
Finland C Est. 2.1 -0.07 0.07     -0.0028  0.07 19 
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Country Equation  Const. LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) CAP CAP2 CORE CORE2 Adj. R2 N 
  P values 0.8556 0.4060 0.6932     0.2817    
France A Est. 8.5 -0.04 -0.10 -0.10 0.17     0.21 96 
  P values <.0001 0.0082 0.0002 0.0787 0.0995       
 A robust Est. 7.9000 -0.0400 -0.0900 -0.0800 0.1600     0.20 96 
  P values <.0001 0.0090 0.0007 0.1706 0.1242       
Greece B Est. -18.4 -0.50 0.89   -0.0429  0.0446  0.10 51 
  P values 0.1734 0.0378 0.0360   0.0066  0.0058    
Croatia A Est. 93.7 -0.57 -1.75 -0.78 0.96     0.35 21 
  P values 0.0054 0.1627 0.0096 0.1422 0.3702       
Hungary B Est. 40.4 0.17 -0.78   -0.1084  0.1020  0.43 20 
  P values 0.4412 0.6255 0.5228   0.0673  0.0947    
Italy B Est. 5.6 0.13 -0.10   0.0018  -0.0021  0.16 99 
  P values 0.0401 0.0022 0.0908   0.1010  0.0696    
Netherlands C Est. -2714.9 -21.88 54.15   0.0175 0.0071 -0.0227 -0.0070 0.00 38 
  P values 0.0711 0.0717 0.0706   0.1626 0.0712 0.1087 0.0727   
Norway A Est. 1.4 -0.05 0.14 -0.12 -0.28     -0.10 19 
  P values 0.8430 0.5033 0.3079 0.4687 0.4044       
 A robust Est. 11.70 0.07 -0.11 0.32 -0.39     0.17 19 
  P values 0.1095 0.4253 0.4285 0.0673 0.2725       
Poland A robust Est. 8.0 -0.04 0.04 -0.55 -0.16     0.26 16 
  P values 0.4184 0.6922 0.8038 0.0035 0.6052       
Portugal C Est. -6522.3 65.81 180.84   0.0115 -0.0081  0.0080 0.03 28 
  P values 0.0515 0.0502 0.0513   0.2427 0.0510  0.0511   
Romania A Est. 5.2 -0.59 0.50 -1.11 -0.13     0.26 42 
  P values 0.7153 0.0007 0.1198 0.0039 0.8343       
Russia A Est. 20.4 0.01 0.05 -0.56 1.00     0.07 79 
  P values 0.0008 0.3893 0.4401 0.0514 0.0708       
Sweden A Est. 5.0 0.01 -0.02 -0.25 0.18     0.15 21 
  P values 0.0531 0.8740 0.7203 0.0328 0.3526       
Turkey C Est. -258.8 5.58 2.10   -0.0139 0.0005 0.0134 -0.0005 0.27 79 
  P values 0.0097 0.0147 0.0023   0.3301 0.0161 0.3375 0.0163   
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Country Equation  Const. LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) CAP CAP2 CORE CORE2 Adj. R2 N 
UK A Est. 8.1 -0.10  -0.44 -0.27     0.08 126 
  P values <.0001 0.2761  0.0069 0.1151       
Ukraine A Est. 52.3 0.14 -0.75 -1.15 1.52     0.18 27 
  P values 0.0371 0.3538 0.0749 0.0110 0.1775       
 A robust Est. 39.9 0.1 -0.57 0.19 0.96     0.24  
  P values 0.0159 0.3344 0.044 0.5037 0.2125       
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Table A5: Country-level regressions on spatial determinants of regional growth in GDP per capita, Europe 1995-2005. 
OLS regressions including initial income. 
- Equation A: Distance to capitals and economic centre points in logs (eguation (2) in the main text). 
- Equation C: Linear distances to capitals and economic centre points and quadratic terms added (equation (4) in the main text). 
 
Country Eq.  Constant ln(y0) LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) CAP CORE CAP2 CORE2 Adj. R2 N 
Austria C Est. 40.3 -0.56 0.05 -0.64    -1.06  0.28 0.20 35 
  P values 0.0007 0.2246 0.6031 0.0077    0.0594  0.0674   
Belgium A Est. -8.6 0.37 -2.39 2.27 0.93 -1.36     0.27 42 
  P values 0.6411 0.4636 0.0904 0.5493 0.0781 0.0392       
Bulgaria A Est. 40.7 -5.24 6.30 -0.12 -1.46      0.17 28 
  P values 0.1156 0.0182 0.0514 0.9798 0.0066        
Czech Rep. C Est. 388.3 -0.18 258.05 -153.07   -4.23 0.58 -26.5 27.20 0.82 14 
  P values 0.0260 0.8878 0.0376 0.0321   0.0044 0.7254 0.0440 0.0397   
 A Est. 83.6 -4.39 1.97 -7.27 -1.26      0.71  
  P values 0.0347 0.1096 0.0933 0.0554 0.0044        
Germany A Est. 15.8 -0.73 0.88 -1.09 0.28 -0.45     0.16 414 
  P values <.0001 <.0001 0.0011 0.0004 0.0033 0.0002       
West Germany A Est. 16.0 -0.64 1.14 -1.28 0.16 -0.40     0.16 348 
  P values <.0001 <.0001 0.0137 <.0001 0.2159 0.0008       
East Germany A Est. 15.6 -1.19 -1.72 0.41 0.75 -0.87     0.11 66 
  P values 0.1697 0.1118 0.3766 0.7742 0.0189 0.0333       
Spain A Est. -0.2 0.72 -0.61 -1.02 -0.03 0.54     0.41 47 
  P values 0.9700 0.2758 0.1459 0.0463 0.7266 <.0001       
 A Est. -0.9 0.82 -0.68 -1.08  0.52     0.42  
  P values 0.8371 0.1669 0.0637 0.0235  <.0001       
Finland A Est. 41.0 -3.16 -0.85 -0.35 -0.35      0.26 19 
  P values 0.0127 0.0317 0.2333 0.7471 0.0669        
France C Est. 3.5 0.40 -0.55 -0.69    -0.12  0.03 0.24 96 
  P values 0.1289 0.0791 0.0011 0.0075    0.2535  0.0583   
Greece A Est. 35.7 -2.74 -0.15 -1.35 -1.10 0.98     0.14 51 
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Country Eq.  Constant ln(y0) LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) CAP CORE CAP2 CORE2 Adj. R2 N 
  P values 0.0549 0.0726 0.9305 0.4454 0.0158 0.2554       
Hungary C Est. -24.4 0.07 -3.27 8.19   -5.01  1.74  0.47 20 
  P values 0.4357 0.9620 0.1288 0.1417   0.0219  0.0478    
Italy C Est. 11.2 -1.51 0.67 1.38    -0.40  0.05 0.20 99 
  P values 0.0128 0.0075 0.0702 0.0499    0.0108  0.0229   
Netherlands C Est. -2836.1 0.56 -227.57 564.48   1.83 -2.07 73.90 -73.20 -0.02 38 
  P values 0.0631 0.4387 0.0645 0.0631   0.1494 0.1511 0.0637 0.0647   
Norway A Est. -6.5 0.94 -0.30 1.09  -0.40     -0.06 19 
  P values 0.5813 0.3137 0.6660 0.3376  0.1961       
Poland A Est. 17.4 -0.82 -1.22 0.37 -0.62 -0.16     0.43 16 
  P values 0.5481 0.7452 0.4681 0.8077 0.0338 0.5215       
 A Est. 19.6 -0.99 -1.39 0.15 -0.65      0.46  
  P values 0.4846 0.6875 0.3947 0.9168 0.0196        
Portugal A Est. 30.3 -1.72 1.45 -2.05 -0.17      0.03 28 
  P values 0.0204 0.0859 0.7276 0.2496 0.4426        
Romania A Est. -7.4 1.34 -5.40 4.82 -0.97 -0.02     0.26 42 
  P values 0.7126 0.3647 0.0030 0.1394 0.0165 0.9727       
 A Est. -7.5 1.34 -5.39 4.81 -0.98      0.28  
  P values 0.6941 0.3462 0.0026 0.1338 0.0144        
Russia C Est. 14.8 1.41 -0.55 0.06   0.20 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.10 79 
  P values 0.0307 0.1361 0.2641 0.9465   0.0938 0.7193 0.1225 0.0480   
Sweden A Est. 26.1 -2.23 -0.23 0.02 -0.40 0.33     0.13 21 
  P values 0.3279 0.4251 0.8012 0.9702 0.0765 0.2306       
Turkey C Est. -196.5 -1.17 44.15 17.10   -1.23 1.31 4.33 -4.32 0.29 79 
  P values 0.0371 0.0680 0.0399 0.0081   0.3611 0.3188 0.0400 0.0397   
UK C Est. -4.5 0.26 -2.31 1.49   -1.00  0.08  0.09 126 
  P values 0.6594 0.6152 0.1278 0.4477   0.0113  0.0593    
 C Est. 12.0 0.59 0.53 -2.30    -0.85  0.19 0.07  
  P values 0.1027 0.2375 0.5512 0.0166    0.0429  0.0483   
Ukraine C Est. -1.8 7.88 -3.48 -4.01   -2.39  0.44  0.27 27 
  P values 0.9520 0.0435 0.0969 0.3873   0.0341  0.0068    
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Table A6: Country-level regressions on spatial determinants of regional change in population, Europe 1995-2005 
Dependent variable: Population change 1995-2005, or closest available years. 
 
 Constant term Longitude Latitude Dist. to capital Dist. to ec. centre Initial per capita income 
 Const. LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) y0 ln(y0) 
 Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value 
Adj. R2 N 
Austria 1.792 0.8431 -0.184 0.0073 0.048 0.7918 -0.258 0.0351       0.14 35 
 -6.077 0.5618 -0.111 0.1771 0.061 0.7344 -0.153 0.2679     0.589 0.1573 0.17  
Belgium -4.279 0.5014 0.192 0.0003 0.072 0.5490 -0.211 0.2047 0.248 0.2496     0.30 42 
 -0.101 0.9860 0.179 0.0005 -0.008 0.9457 -0.006 0.9151   0.006 0.5507   0.28  
Bulgaria -2.017 0.7867 0.298 0.0084 -0.106 0.5446 -0.439 0.0037       0.24 28 
 -7.771 0.4167 0.248 0.0428 -0.104 0.5533 -0.317 0.0980     0.768 0.3334 0.24  
Czech Rep. -0.923 0.8422 -0.059 0.0687 0.031 0.7289 0.043 0.2406       0.14 14 
 6.206 0.0574 -0.033 0.0771 -0.062 0.2601 -0.233 0.0033   -0.160 0.0008   0.74  
W. Germany 2.252 0.0145 -0.053 0.0332 -0.064 0.0002 0.032 0.6360 0.288 <.0001     0.09 348 
 2.961 0.0022 -0.069 0.0066 -0.060 0.0007 0.180 0.0030   -0.003 0.4207   0.04  
E. Germany 3.751 0.5756 -0.331 0.0303 0.074 0.5036 -0.110 0.6411 -0.699 0.0270     0.16 66 
 7.472 0.2748 -0.319 0.0409 -0.006 0.9550 -0.572 0.0019   -0.066 0.1406   0.13  
Spain 8.968 0.0002 0.178 <.0001 -0.159 0.0017 -0.040 0.7472 -0.187 0.3302     0.43 47 
 -9.668 0.1847 0.075 0.1892 -0.296 0.0001 0.022 0.8432     2.381 0.0133 0.50  
Finland 2.005 0.7442 -0.037 0.4985 0.022 0.8493 -0.234 0.0494 -0.246 0.4396     0.37 19 
 -6.513 0.5240 -0.050 0.3127 -0.050 0.5099 -0.119 0.3465     1.198 0.2143 0.40  
France 3.443 0.0143 -0.017 0.2161 -0.092 0.0001 -0.106 0.0320 0.347 0.0001     0.32 96 
 -5.404 0.0912 -0.026 0.0657 -0.090 0.0002 0.113 0.0649     0.990 0.0002 0.32  
Greece 0.532 0.7428 -0.009 0.7713 -0.032 0.3373 -0.124 0.1488 0.347 0.0178     0.08 51 
 0.068 0.9826 0.012 0.6967 -0.042 0.2413 0.032 0.6422     0.146 0.5807 -0.03  
Hungary -8.339 0.2873 -0.045 0.4845 0.248 0.1589 0.661 0.0010 -1.202 0.0014     0.42 20 
 -1.306 0.8974 -0.093 0.2821 0.107 0.6157 -0.150 0.3268   -0.207 0.0426   0.12  
Italy -1.199 0.3294 -0.006 0.7720 0.058 0.0086 -0.011 0.8357 -0.156 0.0182     0.30 99 
 -11.766 <.0001 0.028 0.1850 -0.012 0.6553 -0.018 0.6880     1.270 <.0001 0.39  
Netherlands -1.299 0.9156 0.129 0.4874 0.040 0.8691 -0.066 0.6780 -0.166 0.3274     -0.05 38 
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 Constant term Longitude Latitude Dist. to capital Dist. to ec. centre Initial per capita income 
 Const. LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) y0 ln(y0) 
 Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value 
Adj. R2 N 
 1.221 0.9219 0.118 0.5338 -0.012 0.9619 -0.140 0.3611   -0.009 0.8013   -0.08  
Norway 6.483 0.0601 0.006 0.8790 -0.109 0.0925 -0.141 0.0887 0.250 0.1297     0.50 19 
 0.233 0.9733 0.040 0.3476 -0.140 0.0762 0.020 0.8765     0.847 0.2914 0.46  
Poland -1.624 0.5188 -0.007 0.7867 0.027 0.5399 -0.062 0.2079 0.105 0.1887     0.02 16 
 -0.986 0.7914 -0.018 0.7323 0.035 0.4679 -0.071 0.4035   -0.047 0.7270   -0.14  
Portugal -8.140 0.0471 -1.121 <.0001 -0.064 0.4772 0.225 0.0624 0.144 0.3371     0.49 28 
 -8.036 0.0500 -1.010 0.0001 -0.046 0.6156 0.287 0.0357   0.052 0.3752   0.48  
Romania -7.175 0.0003 0.070 0.0014 0.112 0.0084 -0.033 0.4667       0.30 42 
 -7.506 0.0002 0.078 0.0007 0.106 0.0120 -0.002 0.9677   0.052 0.2136   0.31  
Russia 8.761 <.0001 -0.011 0.0160 -0.127 <.0001 -0.053 0.5794 -0.218 0.2369     0.43 79 
 8.376 <.0001 -0.018 <.0001 -0.158 <.0001 -0.021 0.8178   0.084 0.0045   0.48  
Sweden 4.494 0.0076 -0.005 0.9183 -0.060 0.0703 -0.171 0.0101       0.44 21 
 4.272 0.0215 -0.001 0.9885 -0.065 0.0890 -0.151 0.1043   0.021 0.7533   0.41  
Turkey 19.458 <.0001 -0.069 0.1483 -0.466 <.0001 -0.249 0.4506 0.577 0.3226     0.20 79 
 19.745 <.0001 0.034 0.3680 -0.544 <.0001 0.051 0.7715   0.263 0.0078   0.32  
UK 3.828 0.0180 -0.008 0.8146 -0.061 0.0808 -0.159 0.0243 0.086 0.1850     0.15 126 
 4.027 0.0154 -0.013 0.7147 -0.065 0.0820 -0.106 0.2518   0.010 0.3123   0.15  
Ukraine 2.478 0.2183 -0.047 0.0013 -0.050 0.1456 -0.122 0.0018 0.213 0.0284     0.59 27 
 4.447 0.0445 -0.070 0.0007 -0.062 0.1243 -0.079 0.0815   0.225 0.4193   0.51  
 
 
 
